People place values and judgments on different parts of the world
around them and on how they interact with it. In large groups of people –
think “society” – patterns in valuation and judgment emerge based upon
similar beliefs about what is important and how much weight those
beliefs carry. People, as inherently social animals, tend to congregate
around others that share similar values and judgments, sometimes leading
to divergent ways in which people (within the same society or among
other societies) come to view the world. Within these groups, repeated
patterns of valuation and judgment become the
modus operandi, the
established norms, under which people operate – the normative way of
doing things (e.g., this is how people ‘should’ or ‘ought’ to act; the ideal).
Science can be defined a number of different ways but within each are
common descriptors. People tend to think of (and accept) science as the
systematic study of objects or things, the results of which – through
repetition and testing – bring about some understanding, knowledge or
truth about those things. Indeed, under the principles of scientific
inquiry, science itself is free from valuation or judgments associated
with societal norms, thus leading to scientific inquiry that is
purportedly unbiased (e.g., this thing ‘is’, ‘was’ or ‘will be’…). But
scientists (and the science they conduct) have sometimes strayed from
these principles and 1) waded into the grey area where scientific
inquiry is unduly influenced by valuation and preconceived judgment or
2) masqueraded behind science and the notion of being unbiased to
advocate for particulars policies or stances – otherwise known as
normative science. Here, I a) examine the long-held debate on
the appropriateness of normative science as viewed through the lens
of peer-reviewed articles, b) discuss problems with the existing arguments for
and against and c) argue that normative science, under certain conditions,
has a place in society.
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| Dr. Robert Lackey |
The academic debate surrounding the
appropriateness of normative science has been particularly prominent in
recent years.
Dr. Robert Lackey, retired
professor of fisheries science and
political science at
Oregon State University and retired
EPA senior research scientist, is one of the more outspoken voices in
the recent discussions and argues that much of the science currently being
communicated to the public and policymakers is normative in nature, often presented with value-laden terminology (e.g., “degradation”,
“improvement”, “good”, “poor”, etc.) and masquerades behind the cloak of
unbiased science. As he puts it, society should be making the judgment
calls, not scientists - “there is no scientific imperative for adopting
any particular policy option”. Lackey posits that stealth policy
advocacy is wrong and urges 1) scientists to be cognizant of their
language but get involved in the policy-making process and 2)
policymakers to be alert and recognize normative science and the biases
presented (see his
2013 Terra Magazine piece and an
earlier talk of his from 2004).
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| Philosophical Explorations journal |
Wim de Muijnck (2011), on the other
hand, argues in the journal
Philosophical Explorations that under certain societal conditions and in certain
scientific fields such as psychology, neuroscience and economics –
fields that deal specifically with human behaviors and norms – normative
conclusions are warranted. He argues for normative conclusions because
“claims about human beings tend to be more than claims about mere
matters of fact, because they will often be claims about human needs,
interests and concerns”.
Wyatt Galusky (2000) also argues that in
certain situations, normative science provides societal value. To
illustrate his point, Galusky discusses the field of
conservation biology, an explicitly normative science that suggests that 1)
biodiversity has intrinsic value and 2) conservation of that
biodiversity provides benefits for humans.
But the debate on
the virtues of normative science is not new. Indeed it has been the topic of philosophical debates for generations. In the 1970’s,
Knut Tranöy
(1978) argued that normative science is necessary when 1) social costs
are included as part of the discussions and 2) “scientific enterprise
becomes increasingly oppressive” (he also uses the field of psychology
as an example). In the 1940’s, Iredell Jenkins (1948) attempts to define
normative science, something he says has rarely been done up to that
point, noting that it is usually cast in a negative light next to
descriptive science and the distinctions between both types (descriptive
and normative) is “sharp and significant, though not absolute”
(e.g., philosophy as a science). Some thirty years previous to Jenkins’
work, in 1912, George Sabine (1912) discussed the distinctions between
descriptive and normative sciences, using the examples of physics
(descriptive) and ethics (normative) to draw distinctions and point out
the need for both types of science. Similarly, in his seminal 1907
speech before the
American Philosophical Association (also one of the
earliest papers drawing attention to descriptive and normative
sciences), Ernest Albee (1907), described the distinction between
descriptive and normative science as the difference between what is real
(what is) and what is ideal (what ought to be). In his eloquent essay,
he outlines the benefits of both “types” of science, suggesting that any
science built upon and examining logic is, in fact, normative.
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| The Three Wise Men and the Three Monkeys by Raul de la Nuez |
Within the literature, the dividing line between support of or
opposition to normative science tends to fall along the lines of
appropriateness of making value statements/recommendations. Supporters
of normative sciences (e.g., ethics, psychology, conservation biology)
often point to the need to maintain certain norms of society (e.g.,
killing people outside of war is not tolerated) and that recommendations
originating from these disciplines simply speak to those norms.
Opponents of normative science (note the distinction between previous
reference to normative sciences plural and normative science singular,
here; I refer to this earlier) most often point to the need for the
scientific process to remain free of value and judgment. That is to say,
for scientific integrity to be maintained, scientists must seek to keep
the range of possible questions being asked (and potential outcomes)
open and free from bias. Opponents of normative science worry that
scientific inquiry under the umbrella of pre-conceived notions narrows
the range of potential questions/outcomes. Another oft-mentioned
argument from normative science opponents is the need for scientists to
keep their conclusions and recommendations free of opinion (stick to the
facts). But do not scientists, as humans, inherently have their own
opinions about things, just like non-scientists? If the science they
conduct is rigorous and based upon established scientific
principles/integrity, why then are scientists not supposed to voice
their opinions? In many situations, because they are most
familiar with the data, are scientists not the most qualified to offer
advice?
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| (politicians) Mis-Information (science) |
While these discussions add to a better understanding of
the need to maintain scientific credibility, I see the main distinction
between opponents and proponents of normative science as 1) something a
bit more nuanced and 2) an apples-to-oranges comparison. I argue that
the overwhelming majority of scientific undertakings adhere to the basic
tenets of science. That is to say, people conducting scientific
investigations (scientists), by and large adhere to basic scientific
principles (e.g., deductive/inductive reasoning, hypothesis
formulation/testing, results leading to addition
hypotheses/testing/retesting, replication). If/when they DO deviate, the
peer review process (scrutiny from their peers) frequently catches
biases and “reigns them back in”, a process that is inherently
normative. Issues arise when pre-conceived notions are, at the early
stages, allowed to creep (purposefully or unintentionally) into the
scientific process. Nonetheless, there is widespread acceptance among academics that
allowing values/judgments to cloud the scientific process is
unacceptable. Additionally, there appears to be an implicit accept among academics for the underlying premise of various scientific disciplines
(normative science vs. normative
sciences). Thus, the arguments in the
literature in opposition to or in favor of normative science appear
mostly to be semantic in nature – the underlying science and how
scientists arrive at conclusions is, I argue, operating largely as it
should (i.e., under scientific rigor). Additionally, I contend that
normative
sciences (e.g., ethics, psychology, conservation biology) play
a critical role in understanding and shaping our society. Without
unbiased assessments of human norms (descriptive science), we will not
be able to adopt policies and practices that help society at large (the
normative angle).
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| The Honest Broker |
However, being aware of the potential to
introduce biases, valuation and judgments into the
recommendation/discussion process – crossing the line from simply laying
out (and interpreting) the facts (descriptive science) to advocating
for a particular outcome based up on your own judgments of what ‘should’
be (normative science) is a valuable mental exercise that should be
constantly undertaken by scientists.
Roger Pielke Jr.’s (2007) four
idealized roles of science in policy and politics (see his book
The Honest Broker) help bring clarity to how science can be
utilized in the policy process. Additionally, Pielke’s four idealized
roles reaffirm the need for adhering to the scientific process while
being transparent about interpretation and advocacy. Because regardless
of whether the science is good, advocating for a particular position
leads others to question your ability to conduct unbiased research.
And
as we all are painfully aware in the public policy process, perception
is reality.
References
Albee, Ernest. 1907. “Descriptive and Normative Sciences.” Philosophical Review 16:40. Available on JSTOR Archives.
Galusky,
Wyatt James. 2000. “The Promise of Conservation Biology: The
Professional and Political Challenges of an Explicitly Normative
Science.” Organization and Environment 13(2):226–32.
Jenkins, Iredell. 1948. “What is a Normative Science?” The Journal of Philosophy 45(12):309–32. See PhilPapers' listing.
Lackey, R. T. 2004. “Normative science.” Fisheries 29(7):38–39.
Muijnck, Wim de. 2011. “Normative authority for empirical science.” Philosophical Explorations 14(3):263.
Pielke, Roger A. 2007. The honest broker. Cambridge University Press.
Sabine, George H. 1912. “Descriptive and Normative Sciences.” The Philosophical Review 21(4):433–50. Available on JSTOR Archives.
Tranöy, Knut Erik. 1978. “Normative foundations of science.” Synthese 37(3):471–77.
